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Abstract In recent years the number of research projects
on computer programs solving human intelligence prob-
lems in Artificial Intelligence (AI), Artificial General In-
telligence (AGI), as well as in Cognitive Modelling, has
significantly grown. One reason could be the interest of
such problems as benchmarks for AI algorithms. An-
other, more fundamental, motivation behind this area
of research might be the (implicit) assumption that a
computer program that successfully can solve human
intelligence problems has human-level intelligence and
vice versa. This paper analyses this assumption.
Keywords Intelligence Tests · Strong AI · Psychome-
tric AI · Cognitive Modelling
1 Introduction
As early as the possibility of machine intelligence was
considered, the role of human intelligence tests in the
development and evaluation of AI was linked to the un-
derstanding of what intelligence is and how it should be
measured. However, the question of whether human in-
telligence tests are valid for the evaluation of machines
has had very different (and opposed) answers, including
absolute indifference of or neglecting the question. Why
do we find this diversity of answers? Is it because of
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disparate conceptions of what a machine is and the na-
ture of computation? Is it because of divergent views of
what intelligence is and what human intelligence tests
measure? Or is it because various breadths and types
of psychometric tests are being considered?
In order to find answers, in section 2 we first analyse
the conceptual notions of machine intelligence that have
been adopted in (strong) AI and Cognitive Science, also
introducing the notion of a computational theory of
mind, the Church-Turing thesis, and the Physical Sym-
bol System Hypothesis (PSSH) as necessary theoreti-
cal foundations. In section 3, we rely on the conception
of (human) intelligence and its measurement, mostly
but not only from psychometrics. We highlight the rel-
evance of the set of subjects to be measured and the
set of problems that are considered. Section 4 presents
previous experience about the use of psychometric tests
in AI and some explicit claims about their convenience
for measuring machine intelligence and for stimulating
the progress of AI. In section 5 we are ready to un-
ravel the question by the use of several arguments, and
clarify whether and, if so, under which circumstances
human intelligence tests are necessary and sufficient for
the evaluation of machine intelligence. Finally, we close
with some remarks about how human intelligence tests
can still be useful for AI (and AI for psychometrics)
and future directions for intelligence evaluation.
2 Conceptual foundations of strong AI
In AI as well as in cognitive science research, there
are many projects which explicitly or implicitly aim at
recreating human higher-level cognitive or intellectual
capacities with computational means. Three conceptual
notions are shared by most, if not all endeavours in
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“strong” artificial intelligence and cognitive systems re-
search, namely the concept of a computational theory
of mind, the Church-Turing thesis, and the Physical
Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH).
The computational theory (Pylyshyn, 1980) founda-
tionally bridges the gap between humans and comput-
ers by advocating that the human mind and brain can
be seen as an information processing system and that
reasoning and thinking correspond to processes that
meet the technical definition of computation as formal
symbol manipulation. The Church-Turing thesis (Tur-
ing, 1969) adds an account of the nature and limitations
of the computational power of such a system by estab-
lishing Turing computability as valid characterisation of
computability in general. The PSSH (Newell, 1980) op-
erates on a different level, characterising the nature of
the computations: taking the computational character-
istic of cognition and intelligence as given, it proposes a
general criterion for a system to display intelligence by
stating that “[t]he necessary and sufficient condition for
a physical system to exhibit general intelligent action is
that it be a physical symbol system”, with “general in-
telligent action” referring to rational behaviour which,
in turn, can be understood as an agent’s ability and
determination to select a certain action if, given her
goals, it is known that this precise action will lead to
achieving the goal(s) (cf. Newell, 1982).
The implications of the PSSH are twofold. In its ne-
cessity, it states that also human thinking and higher-
level cognition is a kind of symbol processing. In its
sufficiency, it opens up the way to machine intelligence
also on a paradigmatic level with regard to the type
of computation. Whilst in the meantime also alterna-
tive readings have been proposed, in the classical ac-
count of the hypothesis, the symbols are physical ob-
jects representing things in the world, having a recog-
nisable semiotic meaning or denotation but exhibiting
arbitrary shapes unrelated to their meanings, and al-
lowing for recursive composition with other symbols by
rule, thus forming a combinatorial representation (Har-
nad, 1990). Arbitrariness of shape and combinatorial
nature of the representation are thereby two key prop-
erties: the former allows symbols to designate anything
at all by not prescribing to the symbol what expressions
it can designate, but instead by leaving the determina-
tion of the designated object of a complex expression
to the interaction between respective symbol tokens,
whilst the latter characteristic accommodates for the
generality of the intended intelligent action by estab-
lishing a representation language.
While proponents of strong AI and Artificial Gen-
eral Intelligence (AGI) (Ku¨hnberger and Hitzler, 2009;
Besold, 2013a) explicitly claim that the recreation of
human-level intelligence on computer systems is pos-
sible, researchers in “standard” (weak) AI and Cog-
nitive Modelling work on the weaker assumption that
computability provides an appropriate conceptual ap-
paratus for theories of the mind. That is, computa-
tional models can be used to simulate human infor-
mation processes thereby providing detailed and con-
sistent generative descriptions of different areas of cog-
nition (Johnson-Laird, 1988). However, in both cases,
the methodological challenge is to provide empirical ev-
idence that the behaviour generated by a computer sim-
ulation is based on principles similar to human cogni-
tion. In other words, whenever we create an AI system
or a computational cognitive model, we implicitly or
explicitly propose that the computer program realises
or models (aspects of) human-like intelligence.
3 Defining and measuring (human) intelligence
But what is meant by the term “intelligence”? In every-
day life we use this term intuitively to evaluate our fel-
low human beings. Ascribing intelligence in this context
typically means that this person is better than average
in intellectually demanding areas such as mathematics,
physics or chess. On the other hand, the term intel-
ligence is used to contrast and compare human abil-
ities with that of other species, typically animals. In
the context of strong AI and AGI, intelligence usually
is ascribed by observation or interviewing of a system,
i.e. a kind of implicit or unsystematic conduction of
the Turing test (Turing, 1950). In the context of Cog-
nitive Modelling, performance parameters of computer
models (such as number of iterations to solve a task)
are compared to empirical data (such as solution times)
gained from empirical studies with human subjects.
Systematic research on the conceptualisation and
measurement of intelligence is the realm of psychomet-
rics —a branch of psychology established at the begin-
ning of the last century. Intelligence is defined as the
aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act
purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively
with the environment (Wechsler, 1944). In psychomet-
rics, specific test batteries are designed to capture intel-
ligence by assigning an intelligence quotient to a human
based on his or her performance in a series of tasks.
Typically, such IQ tests consist of sub-tests addressing
different aspects of intelligence, such as visual-spatial,
verbal-linguistic, and logical-mathematical abilities (Stern-
berg, 2000). Many researchers assume that all branches
of intellectual activity are based on a common funda-
mental function (Spearman, 1904). Based on factor an-
alytical models, there is some evidence that there is a
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Fig. 1 A visual pattern problem similar to Raven Progressive
Matrix problems (Lovett et al., 2010).
general factor (the g factor) which determines perfor-
mance in all more specific domains. However, there is
high controversy about the so-called “theories of intel-
ligence”, each elaborating a different “taxonomic struc-
ture of abilities” (Sternberg, 2000), and its correspon-
dence with theories of mind in psychology and cognitive
science.
The most prominent example of a test measuring
general intelligence is the Raven Progressive Matrix test
—a non-verbal test where matrices of visual patterns
are given and the pattern of the given regularities has
to be identified (see Fig. 1). Inductive reasoning with
numbers is another example for a test that is included in
several IQ tests (Amthauer et al., 1999). For example,
given the series 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, the pattern 2× f(n−
1) + 1 can be identified and used to calculate the next
number 127 (Hofmann et al., 2014).
As mentioned above, theories of intelligence and tests
have always dealt with two intertwined dimensions: the
landscape of abilities (the problems that make up the
tasks) and the kind of individuals (the subject popu-
lations). For instance, different sets of tasks (and not
only different ranges of difficulty) are used for children
and disabled people than for the rest of the normative
adult population. How does this duality between tasks
and subjects behave for machine intelligence? The dis-
cussion in section 2 is relevant to the consideration of
the taxonomy of the sets of tasks (symbolic, computa-
tional, etc.) and a hierarchical taxonomy between sets
of subjects in the order humans, animals and machines.
Given that psychometrics provides a well-established
methodological approach to capture human intelligence,
why not adopt a similar procedure to decide whether
AI programs are intelligent? This idea could offer a fur-
ther method to assess intelligence of artificial systems
besides the Turing test approach and the performance
comparison of humans and computer models.
4 Psychometrics and Psychometric AI
“Psychometric AI” (PAI) (Bringsjord and Schimanski,
2003) as a research program aims to apply the full bat-
tery of techniques from psychometrics to a strong AI
context, setting its internal standard by declaring an
agent as intelligent if and only if it does well in all
established, validated tests of intelligence and mental
ability, and subsequently setting out to use the results
of the respective tests in a dedicated effort to build
agents meeting the aforementioned criterion. PAI has
by now become a line of research in its own right as,
e.g., documented by the articles collected in Bringsjord
(2011).
Still, the use of psychometrics in an evaluation-related
AI context is wider. For example, Detterman (2011)
has challenged the field of AI to assess an artificial
system’s performance by using classical IQ tests (but,
unlike PAI, without the commitment to and focus on
the engineering of agents adhering to the introduced
standard). Detterman’s call is issued to AI researchers
working on approaching the level of intelligence exhib-
ited by humans, challenging them to prove the validity
of their claims by administering an IQ test (precompiled
by experts in human psychometrics) to their computer
systems and comparing the actual IQ scores — with the
restriction that in the full version of the challenge only
“a priori algorithms” are admissible, i.e., algorithms not
previously specialised for a battery of tasks.
Over the last years, we can observe a growing num-
ber of publications presenting computer programs solv-
ing IQ test problems, mostly addressing tests with high
loading of the g-factor such as Raven Progressive Ma-
trices and number series problems. In standard AI re-
search, IQ test problems have been identified as chal-
lenging application domains for algorithmic approaches
to inference (Siebers and Schmid, 2012). In AGI, algo-
rithms for solving IQ test problems are designed with
the aim to surpass average human performance on these
tests (Stranneg˚ard et al., 2013a,b).
Some researchers want to demonstrate that com-
puter programs which can solve IQ test problems defi-
nitely are not based on principles underlying human in-
telligent behaviour. A computer program can be hand-
crafted to perform well on a specific set of tasks, such as
an IQ test (Sanghi and Dowe, 2003), instead of covering
a wider scope of problems. On the other hand, there are
some applications of general approaches from theorem
proving (Burghardt, 2005) and inductive programming
(Hofmann et al., 2014) which were applied to number
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series problems to demonstrate that the proposed al-
gorithms are general enough to be applied to problems
outside the original domain.
In Cognitive Science, researchers are interested in
providing cognitive models simulating cognitive prin-
ciples of pattern identification that are assumed to be
underlying human general intelligence (Lovett et al.,
2010). Cognitive models for IQ test problems can relate
the concept of item difficulty of psychometrics with the
complexity of information processing. While item diffi-
culty is defined by the percentage of subjects in a val-
idation sample who solve this item, a cognitive model
can give an explanation of item difficulty with respect
to the necessary effort for an algorithmic solution.
These different perspectives on developing algorith-
mic approaches to solve IQ test problems have differ-
ent underlying assumptions about how to determine
whether a computer program is intelligent: even if AI
uses IQ tests as a challenging area of application, there
is no need to ascribe intelligence to such programs —
evaluation can be done by comparing the performance
of different algorithms. Nevertheless, many researchers
may still have the implicit assumption that a program
which performs better is more intelligent.
When AI algorithms based on general principles of
inference are tested for applicability over different do-
mains, it is harder to define a rank order over approaches.
It is open to discussion which system is more power-
ful —one that outperforms others in some domains but
has weak performance or is not even applicable in other
domains or one with average performance over a broad
variety of domains. One is tempted to use the anal-
ogy to humans which have one isolated exceptional skill
but are intellectually impaired otherwise —so called id-
iot savants (Miller, 1999)— versus humans with aver-
age abilities over many areas. When a cognitive model
is proposed, the crucial question is not whether this
model is intelligent in itself but to what extent it mim-
ics the cognitive processes performed by humans when
solving such problems, that is, whether the model can
provide an explanation of human behavior. How to de-
termine similarity between processing features of a com-
puter model and empirically observable behavior in hu-
mans is a challenging methodological problem in its own
(Cooper et al., 1996). If processing parameters of model
and human performance are judged as sufficiently simi-
lar, the model is assumed to capture the core character-
istics of human information processing. In consequence,
it might be claimed that the model captures relevant
aspects of human intelligence.
From all these approaches, only AGI models explic-
itly make the claim to aim at creating human-level (or
even super-human) intelligence. In this context, PAI
can be seen as an alternative approach to the previously
more dominant observational assessments (like the Tur-
ing test).
5 Can human intelligence tests work for
machines?
The validity of any discriminative test is mostly based
on its necessity and sufficiency. In the case of intelli-
gence, this is not different, and a similar argument has
been applied to the Turing test and other proposals
for measuring (artificial) intelligence. Namely, necessity
means that if a system is intelligent then it must pass
the test and sufficiency means that if a system passes
the test then it must be intelligent.
In order to analyse whether human intelligence tests
are valid for machines we will introduce six arguments
(or characteristics of human intelligence tests) that can
be used to explore whether they are necessary and suf-
ficient, as summarised in Table 1. Many of these argu-
ments rely on machines and humans (and non-human
animals) being different subject populations and on the
breadth and variety of problems in the test.
1. Human intelligence tests are anthropocentric. As hu-
mans are the quintessential example of intelligence, it
makes sense to derive the concept and the measurement
tools from them. Human tests have just been tuned to
become necessary and sufficient for humans (or as much
as possible). For instance, they evolved into culture-
fair tests to solve problems about necessity. They also
evolved to have a range of tasks to solve problems about
sufficiency. So, this argument can be used to question
whether human intelligence, as measured by IQ tests,
is a particular (anthropocentric) type of intelligence,
instead of a universal one. Also, even if it is human-
level intelligence what we want to measure, it is not
clear that the tests can work for other kinds of sub-
jects. Hence, there can be important concerns about the
necessity and sufficiency of these tests for non-human
subjects, such as machines (and animals).
2. Human intelligence tests are administered in a par-
ticular way. Intelligence tests are practical for humans.
A reliable measurement can be obtained with a short
test. As a result, only AI systems that are specialised
to the particular test interface and choice of symbolic
representation can be evaluated, including those tests
that require the understanding of language. In addition,
many tests require the extrapolation of sequences with
no feedback whatsoever about what is correct or not
(e.g., just follow the sequence in a “natural” way). This
happens even if the language or the milieu (e.g., tests
for blind people) are adapted to the examinee. Conse-
quently, the interface raises doubts about the necessity
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# Argument Necessity Sufficiency
1 Human intelligence tests are anthropocentric. Effect Effect
2 Human intelligence tests are administered in a particular way. Effect -
3 Human intelligence tests are specialised to kinds of subjects. Effect Effect
4 Human intelligence tests are usually normalised to a population. Effect Effect
5 Human intelligence tests are robust to training. - Effect
6 Human intelligence tests are composed of many different abilities and factors. Effect Effect
Table 1 Six arguments that can be used to determine the (in)adequacy of human intelligence tests for machines and whether
they can have effect on the necessity and sufficiency of these tests.
of human intelligence tests for other kinds of subjects,
such as machines (and animals, small children and dis-
abled people). As a sign of this, tests for animals are
administered with rewards, not instructions.
3. Human intelligence tests are specialised to kinds of
subjects. The two previous arguments can be responded
by the fact that there are specialised human intelligence
tests for disabled people, for children of different ages,
etc. It could also be argued that the same could be
done for machines. Actually, Detterman suggests that a
“unique battery of intelligence tests” (Detterman, 2011)
could be designed on purpose for machines developed
by “the editorial board of Intelligence and members
of the International Society for Intelligence Research”.
However, which are the criteria for the inclusion in this
‘unique’ battery? And if some tests are developed anew,
what would be the guidelines to specialise these tests
for machines? Would they be still useful for humans?
And what if the battery is finally passed by a machine?
Would the commission be tempted to look for a differ-
ent or more machine-unfriendly battery that humans
can pass but the program cannot, a` la CAPTCHA1
(Von Ahn et al., 2003)? In the end, any adaptation
or specialised selection of tasks would raise questions
about the necessity and sufficiency for machines, even
more than a standard human intelligence test.
4. Human intelligence tests are usually normalised to a
population. The result from a human intelligence test
is just a number that can be compared to other num-
bers, in an ordinal, but not a quantitative way. In other
words, human intelligence is measured at “the ordinal
level”, or is “weakly measurable” (Bartholomew, 2004,
pp. 145). For instance, to make the number meaningful,
IQ is normalised to have a mean of 100 and a standard
deviation of 15. Clearly, this normalisation is not going
to work for other populations, as it does not work for
children or even some subgroups of the human popula-
tion. However, we cannot re-normalise for machines, as
the mere notion of an ‘average’ machine is ridiculous,
because there is no normative population of machines.
This means that even if the human normalisation is
1 CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test
to tell Computers and Humans Apart) are tests (e.g., dis-
torted letters) to detect bots in Internet applications.
used, we have problems about sufficiency, i.e., it is un-
clear what it means if a machine scores an IQ of 20 or
an IQ of 524, as these values are clearly anomalous for
humans. Conversely, from the necessity point of view,
what are machines far below or far above human intel-
ligence expected to score?
5. Human intelligence tests are robust to training. Hav-
ing a public and transparent measurement benchmark
is always a good thing for science. Some human intel-
ligence tests are well-known and public, but not all.
Actually, some academic and professional psychological
tests are never made public, because otherwise people
could practice on them and game the evaluation. Even if
care is taken not to disclose or repeat exercises to avoid
rote learning, humans can prepare for the kinds of tests.
Fortunately, the improvement of training, even if signif-
icant, is limited (Bors and Vigneau, 2001), although the
reasons and the permanent effect beyond the particular
test are not very well understood. Aware of this, Detter-
man talks about two levels in his challenge, the second
where tests are not disclosed previously to the evalua-
tion (so programmers cannot implement specialised ap-
proaches). However, it is not clear that this robustness
to humans trying to game the evaluation by systematic
practising should also hold for machines. As already
discussed in the previous section, specialised systems
can be built whose only purpose is to score well in in-
telligence tests (e.g., Sanghi and Dowe, 2003), without
being able to do well in other tasks. This raises strong
doubts on sufficiency.
6. Human intelligence tests are composed of many dif-
ferent abilities and factors. There are broad test bat-
teries, including many abilities and skills. This is good,
but how far should we go? For instance, PAI states that
machines should be evaluated with “all established, val-
idated tests of intelligence and mental ability, a class of
tests that includes not just the rather restrictive IQ
tests, but also [...] tests of artistic and literary creativ-
ity, mechanical ability, and so on” (Bringsjord, 2011).
However, some humans score poorly on some of these
tests (e.g., Stephen Hawking). Conversely, we clearly
see that some tasks that are discriminative for humans
(e.g., arithmetic or even reaction time) are meaningless
for machines. Even if we agree that results for different
tests should be analysed separately, it is not clear how
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the relations between abilities and factors could be in-
terpreted for machines, or how different tasks could be
weighted for an aggregated value. For instance, if the
g factor has been found in human evaluation, should it
appear for machines as well? More blatantly, should we
expect well-established tests of choice reaction time to
be correlated with intelligence in machines as they are
correlated in humans (Deary et al., 2001)? Most of the
research in human intelligence is then, in principle, not
extrapolatable to machines (not even to animals), rais-
ing delicate issues about the breadth, composition and
interpretation of separate results of any test battery for
machines. Actually, it is unclear whether we can come
up with a right set of problems by making the battery
larger or smaller such that they are sufficient and nec-
essary for machines.
From the above analysis of arguments, there seem
to be serious doubts about the necessity and sufficiency
of current human intelligence tests for the evaluation of
machines. This is consistent with other previous papers
(Dowe and Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2012; Besold, 2014).
6 Conclusions
In the previous sections we have discussed whether hu-
man intelligence tests are valid for the evaluation of ma-
chines. As a result, we have found several issues about
their sufficiency and necessity. Even if we argue that in-
telligence tests are not valid, in principle, for the evalu-
ation of machines, it is important to highlight that this
does not mean that human intelligence tests are useless
for artificial intelligence and cognitive science. More on
the contrary, it is precisely the analysis of what is lack-
ing in our AI systems to score well in a range of human
intelligence tests and what is lacking in human intelli-
gence tests to properly discard those systems that are
not intelligent what can give us insight about the nature
of human intelligence tests and also about the progress
of AI if the tests are generalised. In other words, the
use of human intelligence tests in AI research is use-
ful, provided we are cautious about the semantic and
quantitative interpretation of results.
The PAI methodology for AI, however, does not ad-
vocate for any generalisation or improvement of psycho-
metric tests. This can actually be one of the most useful
outcomes of this process, by the development of brand-
new tests based on (algorithmic) information theory
(Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000; Legg and Hutter, 2007) or
on models about cognition (Mueller et al., 2007), and
their hybridisation with (cognitive) generalisations of
the Turing Test (Besold, 2013b) or generalisations of
psychometrics (Herna´ndez-Orallo et al., 2014), where
tests are devised for any kind of cognitive system inde-
pendent of its type or nature (individual or collective,
artificial, biological, or hybrid). This suggests that an
interesting way of looking at the question is by revers-
ing it: can human intelligence be measured as a very
special case of machine intelligence?
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